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Abstract: This paper addresses the perceived polarization climate 
between opposers and supporters of the former PT government, before 
the 2018 presidential campaign, to understand how its discourses 
manifested through the media, and if it can be related to the eruption 
of political violence. By Content Analysis, the study features four 
relevant happenings in recent Brazilian political history, revealing the 
language of contention (TILLY; TARROW, 2015) between politicians, 
and also in the mainstream media. Drawing from Benoit’s Functional 
Theory of Political Campaign Discourses (2007), we found that hatred 
and polarization have been the common ground in Brazilian politics, 
and tested two frameworks for the eruption of political violence 
(HARFF, 2003; BENESH, 2011), providing an understanding of the 
immediate threats that linger over the country’s democracy.
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O gigante ameaçado: narrativas de ódio e radicalismo 
no Brasil 2018
Resumo: Este artigo aborda o clima de polarização percebido entre 
opositores e apoiadores do ex-governo do PT, antes da campanha 
presidencial de 2018, para entender como seus discursos se 
manifestaram pela mídia e se pode estar relacionado à erupção da 
violência política. Pela Análise de Conteúdo, o estudo apresenta quatro 
acontecimentos relevantes na história política brasileira recente, 
revelando a linguagem da disputa (TILLY; TARROW, 2015) entre 
políticos e também na grande mídia. Com base nos Teoria Funcional dos 
Discursos de Campanha Política de Benoit (2007), descobrimos que o 
ódio e a polarização têm sido o ponto comum na política brasileira e 
testamos duas estruturas para a erupção da violência política (HARFF, 
2003; BENESH, 2011), fornecendo uma compreensão das ameaças 
imediatas que persistem sobre a democracia do país.
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El Gigante amenazado: narrativas de odio y 
radicalismo en Brasil 2018
Resumen: Este documento aborda el clima de polarización percibido 
entre opositores y simpatizantes del antiguo gobierno del PT, antes 
de la campaña presidencial de 2018, para comprender cómo se 
manifestaron sus discursos a través de los medios de comunicación y 
si puede relacionarse con la erupción de la violencia política. Según 
Content Analysis, el estudio presenta cuatro acontecimientos relevantes 
en la historia política brasileña reciente, que revela el lenguaje de 
la contienda (TILLY; TARROW, 2015) entre políticos, y también 
en los principales medios de comunicación. Partiendo de la Teoría 
Funcional de los Discursos de Campaña Política de Benoit (2007), 
descubrimos que el odio y la polarización han sido el terreno común 
en la política brasileña, y probamos dos marcos para la erupción de la 
violencia política (HARFF, 2003; BENESH, 2011), proporcionando 
una comprensión de las amenazas inmediatas que persisten sobre la 
democracia del país.
Palabras clave: Comunicación Política. Odio Político. Política 
Brasileña. Campaña permanente.
1 Introduction
Despite an oppressive slavery past and marked social issues, 
hate speech wasn’t a regular feature in Brazilian everyday talking - nor 
academia. Even though, it has always been a part of Brazilian culture, 
at least for those who really wanted to see it, and not just for racial 
or religious matters. It debut followed an unprecedent period of large 
demonstrations held through the country mainly in opposition to Dilma 
Rousseff’s government and the Worker’s Party (PT) administration. 
Through decades, large demonstrations used to be a prerogative of the 
leftist militancy, however, the 2013 events showed the appropriation 
of this specific repertoire (TILLY; TARROW, 2015) - the public 
demonstration – by a large and heterogeneous group of people, in 
opposition to the political status quo, represented by the government of 
Dilma Rousseff. On the other hand, a fair amount of demonstrations were 
held in support of PT government, building the contentious repertoire, 
both in actions and language, giving room to hatred expressions show up, 
and establishing the conditions to the public confrontation: co-existence.
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Image 1 - Demonstrators occupy the Congress building in 
Brasilia (DF) in June, 2013.
Fonte: Valter Campanato / Agência Brasil
On 06/20/2013, 1.4 million people protested throughout the 
country. In Brasília, the federal capital, demonstrators tried to take 
the Congress and the Federal Government headquarter, the Planalto 
Palace. Clashing with the police, 130 people was injured in Brasilia 
(DF); more than 60 in Rio de Janeiro (RJ) and, in São Paulo, one 
demonstrator was hit and killed by a car trying to go through the 
demonstration.
The wave of rage against an alleged government inefficacy 
continued in 2014. During that year, at least 144 demonstrations 
occurred in opposition to the FIFA World Cup and the public money 
spending. In January, 25th, 128 demonstrators were arrested in São 
Paulo (SP). Twelve months later, 13 people had lost their lives 
during demonstrations - and none those deaths was directly related 
to clashes with the police. One of the most chocking cases, is the 
killing of Santiago Andrade. The cameraman, on duty covering the 
protests for Bandeirantes Television, was hit in the head by a rocket 
thrown by the mob.
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Image 2 - Moment when a rocket hits a cameraman causing his 
death in February, 2014.
Fonte: Agência O Globo
History is filled with cases where daily basis conflicts escalated 
to extreme violent confrontations, like civil wars, mass murders 
and genocides. Since United Nations (UN) declared genocide an 
international crime in 1946, and published, in 1948, the Convention 
on Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, scholars have tried to 
better understand this phenomenon in order to avoid it. The Article II 
of the Genocide Convention defines genocide as the “acts committed 
with intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial, 
or religious groups”. However, the first draft of the document 
included the category of “political groups” among those threatened 
by extermination, but it was rejected by the USSR and its allies, 
worried about the possible international sanctions they might suffer 
for persecuting internal political enemies (HARFF, 2003). 
Genocide Convention have been the cornerstone for legislation 
intending to prevent and punish these type of mass murders, but other 
treated have also helped to stress the importance of the matter. The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the 
UN in 1966, states on the Article 20 that is prohibited any propaganda 
for war as well as any advocacy of national or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility of violence by law. 
For as much as political freedom has been guaranteed by the majority 
of the international laws, agreements and legislation, political hatred 
has not been object of any sanction. This help to explain why major 
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research about genocide have not addressed hypothesis of political 
mass murders as their leading study cases. By the same token, hate 
speech studies and legislation use to draw upon the United Nations 
definition of genocide to set potential target groups (ALLPORT, 1979; 
WALDRON, 2012).
Although an event of such magnitude in Brazil seems to be an 
extremely distant picture, there were no success in preventing political 
mass murders so far, that is, what defines the eruption of events like 
these still can’t be tracked. But there are a few common features that 
are assumed as preconditions to pave the way to assassination: political 
upheaval and hate speech, both blanket in Brazilian political context.
2 Language of contention and the hatred tide 
If the uncivil speeches among Brazilian political discourse are 
common, it was only in some point between 2013 and 2014, that the 
average skilled Brazilian political speaker began to deal with a new 
locution on its vocabulary: hate speech. To Jeremy Waldron (2012), hate 
speech must be seen as the potential harm that publicized discourses 
may unleash. He is worried with those expressions or rhetoric that 
present risks to the assurance that society should offer to its citizens, 
that is, the assurance that the individual or group won’t be subject of 
abuse, defamation, humiliation, discrimination, and violence.
Regarding political speeches, Patrick Charadeau (2015) says 
that the debate of ideas allows many strokes. He believes that ethos 
and pathos are ahead in relevance than truth, in politics. According 
to this stance, Political Discourse would belong to a different speech 
dimension, apart from our daily basis, since character and emotions 
would be elements to be played in order to accomplish a given goal; 
and conflict, an almost sure thing. But is it possible to completely 
detach politics from our ordinary speeches? We don’t think so. On the 
contrary, we believe that the engagement with politics is key, and once 
a tension or emotion is aroused, it’s much more likely that it will be 
carried onto the following topic, rather than just disappear. 
Sidney Tarrow (2013), by his turn, explored how meanings, 
words and expressions are created and assumed as repertoires of 
political contention. Addressing the matter slightly differently than 
Charaudeau, Tarrow says that, even language alone might not drive 
people to conflict, but it plays an important role in the construction, 
endurance and diffusion of contentious politics. According to him, 
political actors constitute themselves as parts of an interactive 
repertoire of contention “that is both behavioral and discursive” (2013, 
p. 15) and the diffusion of the contentious language would respond to 
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strategies of discourses, and culture. Intended to last, arising in the 
mist of political struggles, the repertoires of contention, as dynamic as 
they may be, becomes the natural way to express any political matters. 
To Judith Butler (1997, p. 74), such utterances can be seen as 
the “modus vivendi of power itself”. She sustains that verbal conducts 
“may undermine the addressee’s capacity to work, to study or… 
exercise his or her constitutionally guaranteed rights and liberties”. 
By saying that, she sustains that the repertoires of contention may 
provoke physical effects on the addressee of a speech.
The field of political language assumes that words have the 
power to unite or divide groups of people (JARVIS; STEPHENS, 
2015). When Gordon Allport (1979) worked on prejudice, he 
featured the concepts of ‘verbal rejection’ and ‘antilocution’ as those 
representing the lowest degree of prejudice. He believed that those 
expressions could lead to events such as the Jew genocide, presenting 
a scale of intensity on rejection of out-groups that would go from 
antilocution to extermination, often, with the progression from one 
state to the other “antilocution – discrimination – physical violence” 
(ALLPORT, 1979, p. 57). Recent research on the field provided 
newest terms to address the rhetoric strategies – strokes Charadeau 
talks about – which are responsible to communicate a party or 
politician’s intention to divide. The most common are: uncivil speech, 
outrage and incivility (SOBIERAJ; BERRY, 2011). They basically 
mean a language behavior which is contrary to respect and courtesy 
(BLACK; WOLFE, 2015), a language that intends to raise the level of 
arousal creating emotional reaction (MUTZ, 2007) and can be related 
to hateful speeches (HERBST, 2010).
3 Clipping and methodology
Considering the goals of this study, four events were selected to 
represent, in terms of significance and magnitude, the major political 
happenings prior to 2018 presidential run: the 2014 presidential election; 
the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff (2015); the conviction of the former 
president Lula (2017); and his arrest, accused of corruption and money 
laundering (2018). For each one, by Content Analysis, were investigated 
the political discourses from media actors, political characters, social 
movements, political parties and media outlets (2 daily newspapers, 2 
weakly magazines, one television network), in order to identify on the 
statements, frequency and type, taking advantage of the Willian Benoit’s 
Functional Theory of Political Campaign Discourse (2007). 
In order to do that, we had to come up with the hypothesis of the 
“permanent campaigning”. By this, politics’ popularity in outlets like 
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social media demanded from politicians and political agents a 24/7 
behavior as if they were indeed campaigning. Benoit’s theory states 
that candidates establish discourses preferability, through acclaiming, 
attacking and defending, in order to seek votes; and that political 
discourse can occur on two broad topics: policy – issues - and character 
- image (BENOIT, 2007). We counter the occurrence of these elements, 
completing the framework, elements regarding polarization: media/
PT, and voters/PT, and finally, we will also seek for expressions that 
can be counted as political hate speech. considering Jeremy Waldron’s 
(2012) understanding of the matter. 
By filling Table 1, we identified the most common discourse 
strategies, as well as the most frequent narratives on each side of the 
current perceived political polarization in Brazil. The same was done 
to five players of the mainstream media, disclosing their positionings. 
Table 1
Actors
Polariza-
tion  
Media x 
PT
Polarization  
Opposers 
x PT
Attacks 
 on Policies
Attacks  
on Charac-
ter
Acclaims  
on Policies
Acclaims 
 on Charac-
ter
Hate  
Speech Total 
Media Actors 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Political Actors 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Social Move-
ments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Political Parties 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Media
Polariza-
tion  
Media x 
PT
Polarization  
Opposers 
x PT
Attacks 
 on Policies
Attacks  
on Charac-
ter
Acclaims  
on Policies
Acclaims 
 on Charac-
ter
Hate  
Speech Total
Folha de São 
Paulo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
O Estado de São 
Paulo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Revista Veja 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Carta Capital 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rede Globo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
This first section intended to set forth the polarization climate 
in the eve of the 2018 presidential run. Provided with data, was 
possible to relate political discourses in terms of the development of 
mass conflict. All the discourses analyzed in the paper were originally 
published in television, newspapers, magazines, radio, internet, and 
were lately accessed through the world wide web. The criteria to select 
the discourses was the equivalency between supporters and opposers 
of the PT government regarding time, period and outlets of diffusion.
Rizoma, Santa Cruz do Sul, v. 7, n. 2, p. 51, dezembro, 2019
Rizoma
4 The 2014 Presidential Election
Prior demonstrations against the Worker’s Party government 
wasn’t the only issue rising the tensions during the 2014 presidential 
run. Brazilian economy was starting to give signs of retraction and, 
after 12 years, opposition was excited with a possibility of taking 
back the presidential chair from PT. Running for reelection, Dilma 
Rousseff sized her unpopularity during the 2014 FIFA World Cup 
open ceremony, when she was massively booed, to the point of giving 
up from her speech2.
The list of main challengers featured Eduardo Campos, from 
Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), holding in the second position at the 
polls, and Aécio Neves, from Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB), 
in third. After a plane crash that took the life of Eduardo Campos, just 
a couple months before the balloting, his substitute, Marina Silva, took 
the task of facing the incumbent, Rousseff. She ended up suffering with 
a visceral campaign from its adversaries, and at the last minute, Aécio 
Neves, former governor of the State of Minas Gerais, took the second 
place to reedit, by the fourth time since 2002, a second round (10) 
between PT x PSDB for the presidential chair. Table 2 shows the results 
for political speeches prior to the 2014 final balloting. 
Table 2 - The 2014 Presidential Campaign Analysis
Political Actors Polarization Media x PT
Polarization  
Opposers 
x PT
Attacks 
 on Policies
Attacks  
on Character
Acclaims  
on Poli-
cies
Acclaims 
 on Character
Hate  
Speech
Opposition        
Arnaldo Jabour 0 1 7 2 0 0 2
Aécio Neves 0 1 11 0 4 4 0
MBL 3 2 6 2 0 0 1
PSDB 0 2 10 0 25 0 0
Total 3 6 34 4 9 4 3
Supporters        
Gregório Duvivier 0 5 3 5 2 0 3
Dilma Rousseff 0 0 1 0 8 0 0
MTST 0 2 9 2 1 0 1
PT 16 18 30 5 65 18 2
Total 16 25 43 12 76 18 6
Media Polarization Media x PT
Polarization  
Opposers 
x PT
Attacks 
 on Policies
Attacks  
on Character
Acclaims  
on Poli-
cies
Acclaims 
 on Character
Hate  
Speech
Folha de São Paulo 0 0 3 0 0 0 0
O Estado de São 
Paulo 2 0 1 1 1 0 0
Revista Veja 1 0 2 0 0 0 0
Carta Capital 1 0 3 2 3 0 0
Rede Globo 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2   In defense of Dilma’s government, 
supporters said that those were the 
voices of the elite, the only ones that 
could pay for the tickets. 
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Opposing to Dilma’s recommencement, the most common 
narratives used to denounce corruption inside the PT government, and 
the alleged risk of losing democratic quality in the case of Dilma’s 
victory. It was sustained relating Brazil to countries like Bolivia 
and Venezuela, facing crisis after years of leftist governments. The 
relation between PT and media was also often referred, forcing Dilma 
to defend herself from the possibility of passing laws establishing 
more control over the media.
By its turn, government supporter’s narratives focused on 
dividing history in before and after PT government; and society, in 
“elite” and the “people”. Three of the four political actors referred 
to the act of voting as a matter of “us against them”. Utilizing the 
idea of class struggle, as well as vilifying words to refer to PSDB, 
even relating Aécio supporters to Nazis while Dilma’s with to Jews, 
the rhetoric of fear, displacement, was far more incendiary then their 
counterparts. And also, the mainstream media was represented as the 
enemy. The use of vilifying words, by expressions such as “they tried 
to terminate our race”, uttered by the Worker’s Party President, Ruy 
Falcão, are extremely divisive and created the perception of life being 
threatened to the ingroups. 
A couple of days before the balloting, weekly magazine Veja 
anticipated its edition featuring in the cover Dilma Rousseff and Luís 
Inácio Lula da Silva over the headline: “They knew it all”. The story 
was about a testimony accusing both politicians as accomplices of 
a major corruption scheme inside Petrobrás, Brazilian biggest Estate 
company. Following the publication’s turmoil, Veja publisher’s 
headquarters was attacked.
 
5 The Impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016
Even before the 2014 Presidential campaign resume, some 
voices were claiming for the possibility of impeachment, in case of 
Dilma Rousseff’s victory. Once elected, with the economy shrinking 
and the Car-wash operation, held by Justice and Federal Police, putting 
on the ropes high directors of PT, demonstrations escalated through 
the country in opposition to her continuity. The small difference in 
the balloting (3,28%), also didn’t quite helped the winner to face the 
opposition’s determination to open a process against her. Nor the 
interest of her VP, Michel Temer.
In March, April, August, and December 2015, unprecedent 
demonstrations, supporting both the Car-Wash operation and the 
installation of the impeachment process on Dilma, were held in the 
streets. By the end that year, the Federal Chamber finally accepted 
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a controversial and very technical complaint against the President, 
calling for a “crime of responsibility”, and a commission was formed 
to decide about the opening or not for the process of impeachment. 
Image 3 - Demonstrators fight in São Paulo. 
Fonte: Gazeta do Povo3
Tensions went high in the streets. Demonstrators, both 
supporting and opposing Dilma’s government, were held at the same 
time, but in different places, and controlled by the police, determined 
to avoid contact between participants. Still, many cases of violence 
were registered.
In March of 2016, when the investigation on the former 
President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva began, Rousseff were caught on a 
wire acting to guarantee that the he wouldn’t go to jail on a preventive 
detention. The telephone call, recorded by the Federal Police (PF) 
was illegally released to the media by order of the holding judge 
on the case by the time, Sergio Moro. Turning public the move, but 
disqualifying the evidence, made with suspicions was raised about the 
Judge’s impartiality. Hero for some, target of hatred for others, the 
Judge would become one of the icons of this polarization. 
On April/2016, Congress votes for the impeachment of Dilma. 
She is removed from the office, and Michel Temer, the former VP, is 
swarn as the new President. The act was called a coup d’état by the 
left, denouncing Temer and the media as its major perpetrators.
3  https://www.gazetadopovo.com.
br/rodrigo-constantino/artigos/mi-
licianos-petistas-agridem-patriotas-
-nas-ruas/
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Table 3 - The impeachment on Dilma Analysis
Actors Polarization Media x PT
Polarization  
Opposers 
x PT
Attacks 
 on Policies
Attacks  
on Character
Acclaims  
on Policies
Acclaims 
 on Character
Hate  
Speech
Opposition        
Marco Antônio Villa 0 10 10 20 0 0 7
Michel Temer 0 0 2 1 32 20 0
Vem prá Rua 0 1 29 13 0 8 3
PSDB 0 1 20 15 1 0 1
Total 0 12 61 49 33 28 11
Supporters        
Juca Kfouri 0 1 4 15 6 1 4
Dilma Rousseff 2 5 39 6 13 26 5
MST 0 1 13 7 7 0 6
PT 4 11 54 34 13 19 1
Total 6 18 110 62 39 46 16
Media Polarization Media x PT
Polarization  
Opposers 
x PT
Attacks 
 on Policies
Attacks  
on Character
Acclaims  
on Policies
Acclaims 
 on Character
Hate  
Speech
Folha de São Paulo 0 0 1 4 2 2 0
O Estado de São 
Paulo 1 0 3 4 0 1 0
Revista Veja 0 0 26 6 0 2 0
Carta Capital 6 9 22 28 6 26 10
Rede Globo 1 0 0 2 0 0 0
Tabel 3 shows that the polarization escalated from 2014 to 2016. 
The number of attacks, incitement on polarization, and even the hate 
speech discourses, increased proportionally. In favor of the impeachment, 
the fiercest actor was Marco Antônio Villa, pundit at the radio, TV and 
internet. In one of his appearances, he says that Lula is inciting political 
cleavage and conflict. The historian alarms for the possibility of a social 
clash with violent outcomes given the nature of the inflammatory discourses 
of Lula and his followers, before calling Dilma “a simple creature” and an 
“accident of history”. By its turn, the social movement “Vem pra Rua” 
posted a video with public personalities calling people to take part on the 
demonstrations. Finally, a PSDB speech accused Dilma of being unable to 
govern because she didn’t have the ability to run a country.
By the side of PT and Dilma’s supporters, indignant reactions 
were expected because of the size of the loss: a government and 
its projects. Indignation went explicit. The cornerstone of the 
narratives takes the impeachment as a coup d’état, organized by 
the “elite”, with the help of the “justice” and “mainstream media”. 
These ideas were repeated by 75% of the actors and prevailed as 
the explanation to what happened in 2016 among Brazilian left. 
The ideas of fight, combat and resistance are also reinforced by 
75% of the actors. The social movement “MST” a traditional PT 
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ally, posited themselves as an “army” ready to take the streets 
against what they called a “liberal insurgence”.
Mainstream media, by its turn, featured the day of the impeachment 
as an historical moment to Brazilian democracy. The weekly Veja 
declared the decease of the Worker’s Party, while the daily TV news 
featured the reactions - and violence - during demonstrations in support 
of Dilma. And Carta Capital, a weekly magazine ran by Mino Carta, 
reinforce its role as the major representative of the left in the media - 
aside the internet blogs. Opinions articles in Carta Capital gone strong 
in defense of Dilma. The opening text called the impeachment a “tragic 
farce”, supported and put in action by the “lack of intelligence” of 
Brazilian people. Carta’s rhetoric, partial and strongly divisive, is very 
different from the other mainstream media outlets.
By the time of the impeachment, PT party published a manifesto 
calling the partisans to “unify command words”, concerning 
with shaping a homogenous narrative that would work unifying 
and reinforcing their version of the event. It would work by the 
psychological principle of priming, activating cognitive constructs 
which would lead to subsequent social judgments on the matter.
In terms of hate speech, the analysis on both sides of the issue 
(supporters and opposers of Dilma) shows an increase of its use. Mostly, 
because of the repetition of vilifying words to describe the opponents. 
Among the Rousseff’s supporters’ speeches, “class struggle”, “class 
hatred”, “us against them” expressions were extensively repeated. 
Simplifications like addressing the impeachment as an act of the 
“international bourgeoise interested in precluding the pre-salt oil taxes 
from going to Brazilian education and health system”, was uttered by the 
MST leader, João Stedile. The recalling of a contentious language, carried 
with pejorative meaning, appears when the impeachment is pictured as a 
“new reorganization of the US hegemony over Latin America”. Dilma 
Rousseff also addresses her withdrawn as a “misogynous, homophobic 
and racist” coup, stretching the meaning of the event in something that 
could be seen as an attempt to galvanize minorities around her cause. The 
role of justice was also questioned with hatred, mostly by the repeated 
attacks on the character the Judge, Sergio Moro. On the other hand, 
the opposers’ champion on hate speech is Marco Antônio Villa, who 
dehumanizes Dilma by calling her a “zombie”, a “political puppet on the 
hands of former president Lula”, and repeats that she was an inefficient 
ruler and responsible for all the bad things that was happening in Brazil.
6 July, 2017: Lula convicted
In the beginning 2017, Lula suffered the loss of his wife, 
Marisa Leticia, victim of a stroke. On July, he was declared guilty 
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of corruption and money laundering, by Judge Sergio Moro, on the 
first of three lawsuits he had against him. A nine years sentence 
that would be augmented to 12 years by the second entrance court. 
Lula was accused of being the de facto owner of a beach front 
apartment, in Guarujá, São Paulo, which would have been received 
as a bribe, from one of the biggest construction companies in 
Brazil, Odebrecht. 
The investigation on the former President have been covered 
by mainstream media in details. At the same time, Lula denied the 
accusation and was preparing to run for Presidency in 2018. By the 
time of the trial, a poll ran by DataFolha, showed him in first place, 
with 30% of the voting intention. The second was Jair Bolsonaro, a 
conservative hardliner, from the irrelevant Social Christian Party (PSC), 
with an incendiary discourse. Bolsonaro managed to get 15% of the 
voting intentions, and displaced the traditional PSDB party candidate4. 
It was the first time, in more than 20 years, that a right winger got that 
position, pointing that polarization has reached paramount.
Throughout the investigation, demonstrations were held both in 
favor and against the conviction of the former President Lula. During 
his speeches, Lula started to attribute the death of his wife to a mediatic 
and judicial persecution he and his family was suffering. 
Table 4 - Lula is convicted
Actors Polarization Media x PT
Polarization  
Opposers 
x PT
Attacks 
 on Poli-
cies
Attacks  
on Charac-
ter
Acclaims  
on Policies
Acclaims 
 on Charac-
ter
Hate  
Speech
Opposition        
Marco Antonio Villa 0 4 35 6 0 0 4
João Dória 0 4 0 5 1 1 1
Kim Kataguiri 1 3 1 3 0 1 1
PSDB 0 7 2 13 8 2 1
Total 1 18 38 27 9 4 7
Supporters        
Paulo Henrique Amorim 7 0 0 15 0 10 7
Gleisi Hoffman 7 5 26 33 6 7 5
MST 0 1 4 0 0 0 3
Psol 1 1 6 5 11 3 2
Total 15 7 36 52 17 20 17
Media Polarization Media x PT
Polarization  
Opposers 
x PT
Attacks 
 on Poli-
cies
Attacks  
on Charac-
ter
Acclaims  
on Policies
Acclaims 
 on Charac-
ter
Hate  
Speech
Folha de São Paulo 0 0 1 1 2 2 0
O Estado de São Paulo 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Revista Veja 1 0 2 1 0 0 1
Carta Capital 0 2 1 0 0 0 5
Rede Globo 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
3   The same poll revealed the 
Brazilian ideological profile at the 
time. The findings pointed to 41% 
of the Brazilians identified with 
the left, 40% with the right, and 
20 % with the center. Comparing 
to the same research in 2014, the 
results pointed to a shrinking right 
(45% to 40%), a growing left 
(35% to 41%), mostly caused by 
the identification with behavioral 
issues, while the economy factor 
kept stable, still pointing to a little 
preference among Brazilians to a 
liberal market.
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Although the activism in the streets lost intensity, compared 
to 2015 and 2016, and the same happened with some features of the 
political discourses, the percentage of hatred appeared to raise. In 
opposition to Lula and PT, narratives focused on the Party and its 
leader corruption. The discourses incited polarization by dividing 
the society between “the good people” who would be pleased with 
the conviction of the former president, and the “others”, supporters 
of PT and its corruption practices. Some narratives established the 
judge Moro as a hero, for convicting Lula. In regard of hate speechs, 
Marco Antônio Villa, again, referred the possible end of Lula and PT 
by a death metaphor: ‘the last act on Lula and PT’s political death’. 
Meanwhile, the social movement MBL resorted to the old strategy of 
publishing grotesque images, in order to dehumanize Lula supporters.
In favor of Lula and PT, the attacks were focused on the (in)
Justice and the personally of judge Moro. 100% of the discourses 
featured strong critics to the investigation and the trial, and suggested 
Moro didn’t had enough proves to condemn Lula. According to these 
narratives, Moro did it anyway in accountability to the public opinion 
and the media. The idea of a maneuver to take Lula out the presidential 
run was reinforced in every discourse analyzed. Mainstream media 
was accounted for the conviction by Senator Gleisy Hoffmann, at TV 
Senado, and the pundit Paulo Henrique Amorim, former TV Globo 
reporter, in his Youtube channel. Between the accusations, Amorim 
said that Moro was employed at Rede Globo, and finally, repeated 
the words of Lula about the former first lady, saying that “the lies of 
Globo killed Dona Marisa”.
The mediatic discourses analyzed were the TV news Jornal 
Nacional, from Rede Globo, and the covers of two newspapers and 
magazines, Folha de São Paulo, O Estado de São Paulo, Veja and 
Carta Capital. Except for Carta Capital, all the outlets (80%) referred 
to the case as “the first conviction of a former president because of 
a common crime in history”. The television news from Globo was 
methodic while presenting the sentence to the audience. It analyzed 
the conviction document, trying to show how the judge More get to 
his decision, and this scrutiny on the sentence, could have been seen 
as an attempt to endorse the conviction of Lula. Newspapers was 
worried with polarization, and pointed to the demonstrations held both 
in support of Lula or in support of the Car-Wash operation. Folha de 
São Paulo sayd that Lula was the first former Republic President to be 
sentenced, but the third former president of the Worker’s Party to be 
in that position. 
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Image 4 - Weekly magazine covers on former president Lula’s 
conviction
Veja magazine featured in the cover a closeup picture of Lula, 
with his hand covering part of his face, like he was ashamed. The picture 
highlights Lula’s lack of a finger, by what grotesque appears again to 
be considered incitement to hatred. Carta Capital, by its turn, features 
a slavery painting in the cover, resembling to Brazilian past, with the 
phrase “Casa-Grande celebrates”, recalling the “casa-grande”, major 
symbol of Brazilian oppressive past of slavery. Rhetoric of the weekly 
magazine reinforces the polarization while gives hatred arguments to 
shape the repertoire of words and expressions by which Lula would be 
defended on the public sphere. 
7 Case 4: 2018 - Lula imprisoned
Lula’s attorneys appealed for the two higher instances in Brazilian 
Justice, the Superior Tribunal of Justice (STJ) and the Supremo Tribunal 
Federal (STF) – equivalent of the Supreme Court in US - in order prevent 
with an habeas corpus from what they understood could be an early 
execution of the sentence against Lula. The first session, that received the 
plead, and the second one, that decided about its validity, were broadcasted 
on television, mobilized the media and called the world attention. The higher 
Brazilian Court understood that jurisprudence should prevail, frustrating 
Lula’s attorneys, and returned the power of calling the Lula imprisonment 
to judge Sergio Moro. Barely with decision in hands, Moro expedites a 
warrant, and gave Lula 24 hours to present himself to the Federal Police 
headquarter, in Curitiba (PR), where the investigation was based. 
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It was the beginning of one of the most dramatic moments in 
political Brazilian history. Anxiety was felt throughout the country. 
Would Lula be arrested or try to seek asylum under political 
persecution? On April 7, outmarching in 26 hours the justice deadline, 
and after a big political act, he turned himself to justice. Before it, for 
two days and nights he stayed at the metalworker’s union headquarters, 
the place where he dad began his political trajectory, in São Bernardo 
do Campo (SP). With him, thousands of supporters surrounding the 
place, and avoiding Police and the press from getting close. On the 
morning of April 7, the political act started with a cult in memory of 
the former first lady, Marisa, when Lula, once again, blame media and 
justice for her death.
Image 5 - Lula is about to turn himself into justice at his 
political birthplace, the metalworkers’ headquarters in São Bernardo 
do Campo, SP.
Fonte: Francisco Proner / the intercept brasil
Even after his imprisonment, Lula kept the forefront in the polls 
for the presidency. DataFolha showed Lula with 31%, followed by Jair 
Bolsonaro with 15%, while Ibope showed Lula with 20%, followed by 
Bolsonaro with 14%. 
The narrative against Lula focused on the good and bad 
dichotomy. It’s an old, but efficient, strategy of segregation, while also 
keeps the unity of a given group. An institutional note from PSDB 
addressed to the STF Supreme Court, before the judgment that allowed 
his imprisonment, said that an eventual freedom of Lula would be like 
“kneeling to political pressures” and mocking over the people that 
lives according to the law in Brazil. Days after the arrest, congressman 
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Magno Malta, evangelic and conservative, strong critic of PT 
government, called Lula a thief, and accused him of manufacturing 
the moment of his imprisonment for mediatic use. Malta addressed his 
religious community inciting hatred, claiming for “morality and honor 
against Lula” and accusing the former President of being drunk during 
the cult in memory of his late wife: “Drunk, drunk, drunk” screamed 
Malta in a video published on his Youtube account. 
By the supporter’s side, there were even more intensity on the 
discourses. Luís Nassif, a commentator for newspapers, tv and internet, 
call the arrest on Lula a fascist act, resulted from a fascist tide who 
persecuted the former president and his party. He criticized the justice 
and tried to promote fear by saying that “anytime, the Federal Police 
can knock at your door and take you in custody”. The social movement 
Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT) sayd that the process didn’t 
presented any proof, while attacked justice and the media. The idea 
perpetrated was of Lula’s imprisonment as a result of an elite prejudice 
and ripping of the Constitution. The Worker’s Party repeated the 
metaphor of a ripped constitution and declared the act as a violence 
against Lula. Again, the kneeling accusation against the STF Supreme 
Court, but this time, called by the Lula supporters. Alert for the raise of 
an exception state, creating fear and inciting hatred among his fellows.
The speech of Lula, delivered at the headquarters of the 
Metalworker’s Union at São Bernardo do Campo, SP, is the climax of 
the act by which he turned himself to justice. Loaded with symbolic 
images of resistance, religiosity, and even the return, once there was 
the place where Lula started his career, the performative act featured 
by far the acclaims on his character as the main element of the speech, 
helping to build the moment with even more symbolism. When he the 
attacks, delivers equally to character and policies, but focus on the 
personalities involved with his conviction, the Judge Moro and the 
persecutors, and the institution of justice as a whole. He namely blames 
the Prosecution and the press for the death of his wife, addressing 
the mainstream media TV outlets Rede Globo, Bandeirantes, Rede 
Record as liars. He says: “from now on you are Lula. Let’s ‘re-lular’ 
the media so that people won’t be victim of lies every single day. You 
can burn tires, demonstrate, occupy… my friends are the ones who 
have the guts to invade a land build homes, strike, occupy a farm”. 
One of the most iconic moment is when he says that he became more 
than flesh and bone, that with his imprisonment, he is an idea in the 
mind of the people, and ideas can’t be silenced, ideas can’t die. 
Only authorized press was able to get to the metalworker’s 
headquarters. While covering the act, teams of Rede Bandeirantes and 
Rede Globo were threatened and had their equipment damaged. A car 
from Rede Bandeirantes had its windshields broken. 
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The media highlighted the attacks the press suffered while 
covering the act of Lula. There is a disorder element on the discourses 
of Rede Globo, Folha de São Paulo and revista Veja. The television 
gave full covering to the event since day one, April 5th, with the cable 
channel ‘Globonews’ permanently live following the unfolding of the 
process. Jornal Nacional, the major audience in Brazilian TV News, 
opened that Saturday’s edition with the live link to the airport when the 
plane taking Lula from São Paulo to Curitiba was running through the 
runway and then taking off. The news replayed points of Lula’s speech 
at São Bernardo, when he attacked the justice, threatened the press, 
and incited invasions and demonstrations. Then, the news gave place 
to the judge of the Car-Wash and shows him conceding an interview 
to a Chinese television network. Goes back to the case presenting a 
detailed explanation of the case that took Lula to jail. 
Table 5 - Lula is arrested
Actors Polarization Media x PT
Polarization  
Opposers 
x PT
Attacks 
 on Poli-
cies
Attacks  
on Charac-
ter
Acclaims  
on Policies
Acclaims 
 on Character
Hate  
Speech
Opposition        
Arnaldo Jabor 0 3 0 1 0 5 0
Magno Malta 0 6 12 25 9 11 3
MBL 0 5 0 5 0 0 0
PSDB 0 4 3 2 0 0 2
Total 0 18 15 33 9 16 5
Supporters        
Luis Nassif 0 4 23 11 0 1 4
Lula 18 9 26 25 32 68 5
CUT 3 4 4 4 1 22 1
PT 1 1 8 3 1 6 4
Total 22 18 61 43 34 97 14
Media Polarization Media x PT
Polarization  
Opposers 
x PT
Attacks 
 on Poli-
cies
Attacks  
on Charac-
ter
Acclaims  
on Policies
Acclaims 
 on Character
Hate  
Speech
Folha de São Paulo 2 0 0 3 0 0 0
O Estado de São Paulo 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Revista Veja 2 1 0 3 0 0 0
Carta Capital 2 6 6 12 0 7 4
Rede Globo 5 3 0 5 0 0 0
The exceptionality of the covering confirmed the symbolism 
of the moment. No one could take from Lula what he was and what 
he done: a populist leader, who cared for the masses, launching and 
strengthening important social policies, during a time of economic 
growth. However, now he was a convicted man, for corruption and 
money laundering, and the scandals and suspicions he was involved 
started to show a different face of his government. 
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The covers of the two newspapers, Folha de São Paulo and O 
Estado de São Paulo, highlighted with pictures the moments prior and 
after Lula have turned himself to justice and repeated the “first time of 
a former president arrested” discourse. The covers remit to the political 
moment of polarization, but also, to the disorder and disobedience Lula 
was behind. Veja Magazine featured a cover of redress, with a caricature 
of Lula behind bars and the headline: “Corrupt in jail”. The cover also 
denounces an alleged staging performance of Lula, and the attacks press 
suffered during the event. Carta Capital, by its turn, speaks completely 
in support of Lula, calling again the ideas of inquisition, exception state, 
coup, and threatens saying that “worst days are about to come. Social 
tensions may worsen the actual crisis from every point-of-view, leading 
the end of the year to an even more astonishing conjuncture then the 
cancellation of the election for the sake of national peace”.
8 Overall results
Table six shows the overall results for the analysis of the discourses. 
By the observation of the four tables, is possible to make assumptions 
about the development of each strategy of discourse, as well as in regard 
of incitements to polarization and the use of hate speech rhetoric. 
Tabel 6 - The overall results
Actors Polarization  
Media x PT
Polarization  
Opposers x PT
Attacks 
 on Policies
Attacks  
on Character
Acclaims  
on Policies
Acclaims 
 on Character
Hate  
Speech
Total 
Opposition         
Media Actors 0 18 52 29 0 5 13 117
Political Actors 0 11 25 31 16 36 4 123
Social Movements 4 11 36 23 0 9 5 84
Political Parties 0 14 35 30 34 2 4 119
Total 4 54 148 113 60 52 26  
Supporters         
Media Actors 7 10 30 35 8 12 18 120
Political Actors 27 19 92 39 59 101 15 453
Social Movements 3 8 30 9 9 22 11 92
Political Parties 22 31 98 44 90 46 9 340
Total 59 68 293 139 242 194 59  
Media Polarization  
Media x PT
Polarization  
Opposers x PT
Attacks 
 on Policies
Attacks  
on Character
Acclaims  
on Policies
Acclaims 
 on Character
Hate  
Speech
Total
Folha de São Paulo 2 0 5 8 4 4 0 23
O Estado de São Paulo 4 0 5 6 1 1 0 17
Revista Veja 4 1 30 10 0 2 1 47
Carta Capital 9 17 34 42 9 33 19 163
Rede Globo 7 4 0 8 0 1 0 20
Total 26 22 74 74 14 41 20  
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Starting with incitement to polarization, is possible to say by the 
analysis that it developed reaching the higher point with the discourses 
around the arresting of Lula. The Media vs. PT Government incitement 
comes mostly from Lula itself, during the 2014 election and again, by 
the time of his imprisonment. The analysis also found that Carta Capital 
discourses works differently from the other media outlets. The majority 
of elements marked in the tables came from Carta Capital speeches, but 
this didn’t quite work in terms of the incitement to polarization Media vs. 
PT Government. There is a tenue equivalence between Carta and Globo, 
despite most of the Globo incitement be reactive to the very incitement. 
Once at stake the incitement Opposers vs. PT supporters, it 
was bigger by the 2014 presidential election, and the major founts of 
utterances are the media actors (comentators) and the PSDB party, by 
the side of the Opposition to PT government; and politicians and PT 
party, by the side of the supporters of PT government. Even with these 
utterances being more frequent four years ago, there is still a strong 
recurrence to this rhetoric over the years and is expected that the next 
presidential campaign will raise the level again, like happened in 2014. 
The media, by its turn, doesn’t get relevant markers on the issue, except 
for Carta Capital, during the impeachment and the Lula’s arresting.
In terms of hate speech like discourses, the commentators 
again are the main users of the rhetoric. On the opposition side of 
the table, politicians, social movements and political parties indeed 
used hatred arguments, but not quite as much as media actors. On 
the supporter’s side, same goes to media actors, but there is a much 
stronger participation from the politicians and social movements. 
Table 7 - Preferred strategies
Opposers repertoire  Supporters repertoire  Media repertoire  
Attacks on Policies 148 Attacks on Policies 293 Attacks on Policies 74
Attacks on Character 113 Acclaim on Policies 242 Attacks on Character 74
Acclaim on Policies 60 Acclaim on Character 194 Acclaim on Character 41*
Polarization on voters 54 Attacks on Character 139 Polarization on media 26
Acclaim on Character 52 Polarization on voters 68 Polarization on voters 22
Hate Speech 26 Polarization on media 59 Hate speech 20 *
Polarization on Media 4 Hate Speech 59 Acclaim on Policies 14 *
*Media acclaims on character have 33 of 41 made by Carta 
Capital; hate speech have 19/20, and acclaim on policies 9/14.
In regard of the strategy of the speeches, table 7 shows what each 
category (opposers, supporters, and media) establish as their preferred 
repertoire. From the William Benoit (2007) Functional Theory of Political 
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Campaign Discourse perspective, there is an initial incongruence: the 
preference for attacks rather than acclaims. On the other hand, there is 
studies arguing that the independent voters respond only to negative 
advertising (ANSOLABEHERE; IYENGAR, 1995). Hence, the strategy 
of attack can be considered a sort of negative advertisement intended to 
win the votes of those who are not committed with one side or another. 
Other than that, the policy comments being more frequent than the 
character ones is in accordance with the Benoit’s theory.
9 Final Considerations
By the analysis of the four event’s political discourses, considering 
its contexts, it is possible to make some assumptions. To begin, is relevant 
to say that there is no sign of mitigation in regard of the polarization 
between PT supporters and opposers. This is particularly important on 
the eve of a new political campaign, because traditionally the political 
excitement grow during such periods. For instance, the aftermath of 2007 
Kenya presidential elections were a two-month humanitarian crisis that 
killed at least 1.500 people. As we can observe by the Brazilian 2014 
election analysis, that was one of the biggest incendiary periods for 
political discourses. So, it would be expected to happen again in 2018. 
The more dedicated the speeches are, the more increases the number of 
attacks and, hence, incitements of hatred and polarization. 
Second, the incitement of polarization is not a prerogative of one of 
the sides. When taken independently, the incitement of polarization between 
voters is bigger on the PT opposers, reaching 11,8% against 6,8% of the 
supporters. But taking it together, the numbers are almost even: 12,6% 
for the opposers, and 12,0% for the supporters. So, the total percentage 
of the discourses inciting polarization, that is, going beyond the normal 
differences between one choice and another, is 12%. Same goes with hate 
speech. PT opposers discourses dedicated 5,6% of their speech time to 
incite hatred among their audiences, while the supporters dedicated 5,5%. 
Summing what was considered polarization and hate speech, there is 15% 
of the time of the speeches dedicated to excite distinct political identities, 
creating or reinforcing an already existent political cleavage.
In regard of media speeches, the cases analyzed by the study showed 
that 17,7% of the discourses were meant to incite polarization. However, 
9,59% of it is due to Carta Capital alone. Same goes to hate speech, where 
Carta Capital uttered 19 of 20 hate speech like discourses. We know that 
have been covers of Veja dehumanizing or appealing to grotesque when the 
matter was Lula and Dilma. Sometimes it happens very subtilty, just like the 
highlight on a missing finger found during the conviction analysis on this 
study, and sometimes it is more expressive, like when both politicians were 
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pictured as the mythologic Medusa, with snakes instead of hair on their 
heads. But Carta Capital seems to go much beyond its media outlet role and 
its practices can easily be confused as an open PT government advocacy. 
The use of metaphors, repetition of expressions and symbols, the alleged 
lack of intelligence of those who opposed to Lula and Dilma, are mediatic 
discourses that can be compared, for instance, to those of the weekly Der 
Stumer, during the Third Reich. Furthermore, Carta Capital went all the 
way picturing an enemy, just misses the ordering for extermination.
In the beginning of the article we refer the Gordon Allport’s work 
on prejudice (1979), where he sustains that the presence of antilocution 
is a conditional element in the development of cases which unfold on 
extreme violence, such as the genocides. These types of utterances have 
also been the subject of more recent studies, like the Susane Benesh’ 
(2011), presented at the United Nations, and intended to provide a scheme 
capable of anticipate the outbreak of violence. According to Benesh’ 
guidelines, five factors can be observed before the social violence erupts: 
(1) the speaker’s influence power; (2) audience with fears or complaints 
that the speaker can cultivate; (3) a discourse understood as a call for 
violence; (4) social or historical context conducive to violence; (5) the 
influential spread. By these framework, we notice that Brazilian case can 
fills every factor, maybe except for the third and fourth. Considering the 
charismatic power of Lula (1), the left wing unified complaint and fear 
of a liberal take over and its consequences (2), and the influential spread 
of the democratized media (5), those are conditions already capable of 
turning an audience, like would say Schumpeter (1961, p. 330-331) “into 
a psychological mob getting to the frenzy situation where an argument 
intention does nothing but awaken the animal spirits”. One could argue 
that the calling for resistance “until the last consequences” could be 
considered an ultimate to violence filling condition (3), and what we 
would have left is to consider or not Brazilian social historical context 
can be conducive to violence. Some would say yes, remembering not 
only the guerrillas’ anti-military regime organized during the 60’s and 
70’s, but the very Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem-Terra (MST), that 
conducts and considers itself an organized army.
Barbara Harff (2003) by her turn, brings six preconditions for the 
occurrence of genocides and politicides: (1) Political upheaval; (2) Prior 
Genocides or habituation to mass killings; (3) Political systems with 
exclusionary ideologies and autocratic rule; (4) ethnic and religious 
cleavages; (5) Low economic development; and (6) International 
context, economic and political interdependence. Here, Brazil apparently 
is out of the danger of developing a case of such magnitude. Indeed, 
there is and there will be more political upheaval ahead (1); indeed, 
the intolerance demonstrated by the discourses both in opposition and 
in support of PT government represent the filling of condition (3); 
(1) http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Profes-
sionalInterest/Pages/CrimeOfGeno-
cide.aspx
(2) <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&clang=_
en&mtdsg_no=IV-4&src=IND>
(3) Ibope survey institute asked to 2000 
demonstrators the three main reasons 
for them to be in the streets protesting. 
Source: <http://g1.globo.com/brasil/li-
nha-tempo-manifestacoes-2013/platb/>
(4) https://noticias.uol.com.br/coti-
diano/ultimas-noticias/2013/06/20/
em-dia-de-maior-mobilizacao-pro-
testos-levam-centenas-de-milhares-
-as-ruas-no-brasil.htm
(5) http://g1.globo.com/brasil/no-
ticia/2013/06/protestos-pelo-pais-
-tem-125-milhao-de-pessoas-um-
-morto-e-confrontos.html
(6) https://blogdomariomagalhaes.
blogosfera.uol.com.br/2014/07/09/rio-
-sao-paulo-e-bh-lideram-ranking-de-
-cidades-com-mais-protestos-na-copa/
(7) http://g1.globo.com/politica/
noticia/2014/06/pelo-menos-13-
-pessoas-morreram-em-um-ano-de-
-protestos-pelo-pais.html
(8) Waldron’s concept regards race, 
ethnicity, religion, gender and, in 
some cases, sexual orientation as 
causes of hatred.
(9) Brazilian electoral rules states that, 
to win, the candidate must have 50% 
+ 1 of the valid votes. If none of the 
candidates accomplish that number, a 
second round is called between the top 
two, to see who the winner will be.
(10) http://www.pt.org.br/nota-oficial-
-resolucao-politica-contra-o-golpe/
(11) http://media.folha.uol.com.
br/datafolha/2017/07/03/d2a8a-
70683c9fa81dcaebffab0375823df-
9674ca.pdf
(12) http://www.bbc.com/portugue-
se/brasil-43309946
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and indeed, the economy retraction and the high unemployment rates 
fills easily condition (5). The closest thing to a genocide Brazil have 
had participation occurred 150 years ago, at the Paraguay war, when 
Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay almost extinguished with the entire 
male population of that country. However, in 2017, Brazil was ranked 
number one in the world in violent deaths, registering 70.200 thousand 
murders. That is more than Syria. Among the 50 more violent cities in the 
World, 17 are Brazilian cities (13). So, there is some room for talk. The 
conditions four (ethnic and religious cleavages) are maybe one of the 
strongest so far in maintaining Brazil away from violence. Despite the 
ethnic disparities, Brazil doesn’t have the same approach on race as, for 
instance, the US. Religiously and racially, the country is a multifaceted 
mosaic, dealing with differences but without hatred involved. However, 
political hatred seems to be taking the place of these potential issues, 
like the Freudian (FREUD, 1915 [1980]) escape valve tried to explain at 
the beginning of the XX century. Finally, the six condition, which would 
be the international context, economic and political interdependence. 
It would be very difficult for one of the ten biggest economies in the 
world, a position owed mostly to the exportation of primary goods, 
dependent of international manufactured products, and that have plead 
for years for a chair at the UN’s Security Council to detach from of all 
these characteristics in order to foresee a possible outbreak of declared 
civil war. But if we look at the other side of the fence, to Venezuela, 
we must consider even that a strong supporting condition such as the 
international economic and political interdependence as capable of ruin.
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